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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Lynn Johnson appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of possessing methamphetamine with intent to deliver,
possessing marijuana, and possessing drug paraphernalia.

On appeal, he

challenges the denial of his motion for a mistrial and also argues the district court
imposed an excessive sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On April 27, 2011, police officers executed a search warrant on a
residence at 4219 W. Bethel Street in Boise.

(Tr., 1 p.145, Ls.11-16, p.177,

Ls.15-24, p.284, Ls.4-18, p.299, Ls.5-11, p.381, Ls.4-11.) Amber Leonard and
Jacob Lee were the only individuals present in the home when the officers
searched it. (Tr., p.375, Ls.16-21, p.382, L.24 - p.383, L.8.) Although Johnson
was not present during the search, officers believed he resided in the home with
Leonard. (Tr., p.388, Ls.11-20, p.394, Ls.19-24.)
While searching a bedroom of the house, officers found a letter and an
identification card with Johnson's name on them, several methamphetamine
pipes, a box of Ziploc baggies, a propane torch, and "a lot" of a white powdery
substance.

(Tr., p.154, L.7 - p.161, L.10; State's Exhibits 2-5.) In a second

bedroom, officers found marijuana, a methamphetamine pipe, cash and a drug

1

The appellate record contains two separately bound volumes of transcripts.
The volume containing the transcript of the jury trial held March 26-28, 2012, is
cited herein as "Tr." The volume containing the transcript of the sentencing
hearing held May 16, 2012, is cited herein as "Sent. Tr."
1

ledger. (Tr., p.238, L.10 - p.242, L.8; State's Exhibits 18-26.) In the garage,
they found a safe that contained methamphetamine, marijuana, measuring
devices, packaging materials, pipes and over $300 in cash. (Tr., p.164, Ls.5-7,
p.183, L.19 - p.190, L.3, p.192, L.13 - p.195, L.9, p.196, L.8 - p.199, L.10;
State's Exhibits 6-8, 10-17.) Also in the safe were Johnson's social security
card, birth certificate, vehicle title and credit card. (Tr., p.190, L.4 - p.191, L.10,
p.390, L.19 - p.392, L.19; State's Exhibits 9, 34-36.)
Officers ultimately arrested Johnson at his workplace and, in a postMiranda2 interview, Johnson admitted the safe in the garage was his. 3

(Tr.,

p.394, L.19 - p.395, L.22.) After being advised of her Miranda rights, Leonard
initially indicated she did not want to talk to officers. (Tr., p.384, L.21 - p.385,
L.2, p.394, Ls.11-18, p.515, Ls.17-22; see also PSI, p.15.) She subsequently
waived her Miranda rights, however, and made several admissions, including
that she used and dealt marijuana, that she smoked methamphetamine earlier in
the

day,

and

that

the

items

in

the

second

bedroom,

including

the

methamphetamine pipe, belonged to her. (Tr., p.309, L.3 - p.321, L.12, p.355,
L.9 - p.357, L.7.)
The state charged Johnson with possession of methamphetamine with
intent to deliver, possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia.

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3

Although not presented as evidence at trial, the record indicates that, after
admitting the safe was his, Johnson invoked his right to counsel. (PSI, p.18.)
The prosecutor apparently inadvertently made reference to this fact in his
opening statement at Johnson's first trial and, as a result, a mistrial was
declared. (R., pp.60-62.)
2

(R., pp.35-36.) The state also charged Leonard, in a separate case, with several
drug related crimes.

(See Tr., p.10, L.10 - p.11, L.11.)

The cases were

consolidated for trial. (R., pp.11-13.)
In the joint trial that followed, Johnson did not testify. (Tr., p.446, Ls.1015.)

Leonard testified, but her testimony was inconsistent with many of the

admissions she had made in her post-Miranda interview.

(See generally, Tr.,

p.448-78.) In rebuttal, the prosecutor introduced an audio recording of Leonard's
police interview, in which there was a brief reference to the fact that Leonard had
initially indicated a desire to not answer any questions. (Tr., p.511, L.24 - p.516,
L.1; State's Exhibit 37.) Leonard moved for a mistrial and Johnson joined the
motion, arguing there was a possibility the jury would impute Leonard's silence to
him and infer his guilt therefrom.

(Tr., p.516, L.2 - p.549, L.20.) The district

court denied the motion (Tr., p.529, Ls.4-20, p.534, L.13 - p.535, L.7, p.548, L.4
- p.549, L.21 ), finding specifically with respect to Johnson that "there [had]
actually been no comment by anybody about him remaining silent" (Tr., p.543,
Ls.11-14), and also finding that "any chance of prejudice [was] so slight" that a
mistrial was not warranted (Tr., p.549, Ls.15-20). The court ordered the parties
to refrain from making any comment about the offending portion of the recording
in front of the jury (Tr., p.534, L.23 - p.535, L.7), allowed the state to introduce a
redacted recording (State's Exhibit 378) (Tr., p.634, L.5 - p.638, L.14, p.639, L.1
- p.651, L.12), and did not allow the original recording (State's Exhibit 37) to be
submitted to the jury during their deliberations (Tr., p.551, L.24 - p.552, L.18; R.,
p.150).

3

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Johnson guilty as charged.
(R., p.124; Tr., p.714, Ls.3-12.) The district court entered judgment on the jury's
verdict and imposed an aggregate unified sentence of 15 years, with three years
fixed. (R., pp.127-30.) Johnson timely appeals. (R., pp.134-37.)

4

ISSUES
Johnson states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied
Mr. Johnson's motion for a mistrial?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a
unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed,
upon Mr. Johnson following his conviction for felony
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
deliver?

(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Johnson failed to show an abuse of discretion in the denial of his
motion for a mistrial?

2.

Has Johnson failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
in imposing a unified sentence of 15 years, with three years fixed, upon
his conviction for possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver?

5

ARGUMENT

I.
Johnson Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His
Motion For A Mistrial
A.

Introduction
When she was arrested, Johnson's co-defendant, Amber Leonard, made

a number of admissions regarding her connection to the Bethel Street residence
that was the subject of the search warrant, the items of contraband that were
found there, and her own illegal drug activity.

(Tr., p.355, L.9 - p.357, L.7,

p.309, L.3 - p.321, L.12, p.639, L.3 - p.651, L.12; State's Exhibit 37B.) In her
case-in-chief, Leonard testified inconsistently with those admissions.

(See

generally, Tr., pp.448-78.) In rebuttal, the state offered into evidence an audio
recording of Leonard's police interview (State's Exhibit 37). (Tr., p.511, L.11 p.512, L.25.) The recorded interview, which had been provided to both defense
counsel the night before (Tr., p.518, Ls.14-16, p.555, L.11 - p.556, L.3), was
admitted without objection and published to the jury (Tr., p.512, L.24 - p.514,
L.14).
Near the beginning of the recording, the following exchange took place
between the interviewing officer and Leonard:
OFFICER: Here is the thing: The charges that you are looking at
only - I mean, there's a meth pipe back in your room. There is
some weed out in the garage and paraphernalia everywhere. You
talked to Officer Reimers. Okay. I would rather not charge you
with a bunch of stuff that isn't really - that's yours. And I know you
said to him that you didn't want to answer questions. I think you're
straight-up enough AMBER LEONARD: Right.

6

OFFICER[:] I would like to ask you what's yours and what's not
yours.
(Tr., p.515, L. 13 - p.516, L.1.)
Immediately following this exchange, Leonard's counsel asked to pause
the recording and, outside the presence of the jury, requested a mistrial. (Tr.,
p.516, L.2 - p.517, L.6.) As the basis for his motion, Leonard's counsel argued
the prosecutor had engaged in misconduct by not redacting from the recording
the reference to Leonard's assertion of her right to remain silent.

(R., p.516,

L.12- p.517, L.6, p.521, L.10- p.522, L.16, p.526, L.22- p.527, L.2.) After the
district court indicated it was "inclined to deny the motion" (Tr., p.529, Ls.4-20),
counsel for Johnson joined the motion for mistrial, arguing:
With the issue in this particular case, I do believe there also arises
an undue prejudice towards my client. Ms. Leonard has testified as
to facts that relate directly to Mr. Johnson.
And my concern is now, as I reviewed the cases once again
just over the break, that somehow is her silence now going to be
imputed to my client? The issue that we have here is I have got my client has asserted his right to remain silent.
(Tr., p.531, L.22 - p.532, L.9; see also Tr., p.542, L.6 - p.543, L.6 ("So my client
is now left with exercising his right to remain silent because we have rested.
There is testimony in the record that infers guilt from exercising your right to
remain silent. So we are in a position where I do believe that it is prejudicial.").)
The district court ultimately denied the motion for a mistrial, concluding with
respect to Johnson that there had not actually been any comment on his right to
remain silent. (Tr., p.543, Ls.7-14.) The court also noted it was "not convinced"
the jury would "even pay any attention to" the comment on Leonard's silence

7

given "the way it came up in this case" (Tr., p.548, Ls.19-22) and found "any
chance of prejudice is so slight" that a mistrial was not warranted (Tr., p.549,
Ls.15-20).
Johnson now challenges the denial of his motion for a mistrial, arguing as
he did below that "the prosecutor committed misconduct by using [the
interviewing officer's] statement regarding Ms. Leonard's invocation of the right
to remain silent to indirectly comment on Mr. Johnson's own silence and thereby
have the jury infer his guilt." (Appellant's brief, p.14.) To the extent Johnson's
prosecutorial misconduct argument rests on a vicarious assertion of Leonard's
Fifth Amendment privilege, it fails; there was no comment on Johnson's postMiranda silence, and Johnson lacks standing to complain of a violation Leonard's
constitutional rights.

Even assuming Johnson could vicariously rely on a

violation of Leonard's constitutional privilege to establish a violation of his own
constitutional rights, he has failed to show any basis for reversal; viewed in
context of the full record, the brief reference to Leonard's invocation of the right
to remain silent was not so prejudicial as to deprive Johnson of a fair trial.
Johnson has failed to establish error in the denial of his motion for a mistrial.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review for the denial of a motion for mistrial is

well-established.

"[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial court

reasonably exercised its discretion in light of the circumstances existing when the
mistrial motion was made."

State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, _ , 297

P.3d 257, 263 (Ct. App. 2013). Rather, the reviewing court "examine[s] whether

8

the event that precipitated the motion constituted reversible error when viewed in
the context of the full record."

kl (citing State v.

Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908,

912, 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2003); State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 765-66, 27 4
P.3d 1279, 1280-81 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 192, 254
P.3d 77, 93 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891,
894 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Urguhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105
(Ct. App. 1983)). The focus of appellate review "is upon the ultimate impact on
the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion," and "[t]he trial court's
refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that event, viewed
retrospectively, amounted to reversible error." Frauenberger, 154 Idaho at_,
297 P.3d at 263 (citing Urguhart, 105 Idaho at 95, 665 P.2d at 1105).

C.

Johnson Cannot Demonstrate That The Comment On Leonard's PostMiranda Silence Improperly Infringed On His Own Fifth Amendment And
Due Process Rights
A mistrial is appropriate where there "occurs during the trial an error or

legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom,
which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial."
I.C.R. 29.1 (a).

Johnson's motion for mistrial rested on his claim that the

prosecutor committed misconduct by introducing evidence of Leonard's postMiranda silence for the purpose of inferring her guilt, and that "somehow" the jury
might impute Leonard's silence to Johnson and infer his guilt therefrom. (Tr.,
pp.531, L.22 - p.533, L.3, p.542, L.6 - p.543, L.6.) Although phrased somewhat
differently, Johnson advances essentially the same argument on appeal,
contending "the prosecutor committed misconduct by using [evidence of] Ms.

9

Leonard's invocation of the right to remain silent to indirectly comment on Mr.
Johnson's own silence and thereby have the jury infer his guilt." (Appellant's
brief, p.14.)

Regardless of the phrasing, Johnson's complaint ultimately boils

down to a claim that presentation of evidence that Leonard invoked her Miranda
rights somehow improperly infringed on Johnson's own Fifth Amendment and
due process rights. This claim is without merit. As found by the district court,
there was no actual comment on Johnson's post-Miranda silence (Tr., p.543,
Ls.11-14), and the evidence of Leonard's post-Miranda silence did not, as a
matter of law, violate Johnson's constitutional rights.
"The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well
as Article 1, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee a criminal defendant
the right not to be compelled to testify against himself." State v. Ellington, 151
Idaho 53, 60, 253 P.3d 727, 734 (2011) (citing U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV;
Idaho Cost. art. I, § 13).

In recognition of this privilege, and of the implied

promise attendant to Miranda warnings that "silence will carry no penalty," the
United States Supreme Court held in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976),
that the "use for impeachment purposes of [a defendant's] silence, at the time of
arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Accord, ~ . State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 300
P.3d 1046, 1056 (2013) (comment in closing argument on defendant's postMiranda silence violated defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); Ellington, 151

Idaho at 60, 253 P.3d at 734 ("[A] prosecutor may not use evidence of post-
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arrest, post-Miranda silence for either impeachment, or as substantive evidence
of guilt in the State's case-in-chief." (internal citations omitted)).
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is, however,
purely a personal right and may not be vicariously asserted.

Bellis v. United

States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974); Doyle, 426 U.S. at 627 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("a defendant may not object to the violation of another person's
privilege); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 984 (5 th Cir. 1977) (same),
vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810 (1978); United States v. Cardenas

Alvarado, 806 F.2d 566, 574 (1986); People v. Homes, 654 N.E.2d 662, 668 (Ill.
App. 1995). For this reason, "a defendant cannot complain of any Doyle-type
unfairness that might be seen in impeachment of a defense witness." Rubin,
559 F.2d at 984; see also Homes, 654 N.E.2d at 668 (defendant lacked standing
to complain the use of a defense witness' post-arrest silence for impeachment of
defense witness violated defendant's own Fifth Amendment rights). Nor can a
defendant complain that the improper use of a co-defendant's post-Miranda
silence violated his own Fifth Amendment rights. See Cardenas Alvarado, 806
F.2d at 574 (declining to consider defendant's claims that comments at trial on
co-defendants' silence improperly commented on defendant's silence because
defendant "could only complain about violations of his own rights").

Yet

vicariously asserting Leonard's rights is exactly what Johnson is improperly
attempting to do in this case.
It is uncontested that the prosecutor did not introduce into evidence any
actual reference to Johnson's own post-Miranda silence. While the reference in

11

the state's rebuttal case to Leonard's statement she, at one time, did not want to
answer any questions could conceivably have violated Leonard's rights against
self incrimination, it did not, as a matter of law, violate Johnson's own rights. 4
Johnson has therefore failed to establish that the district court erred in denying
his motion for a mistrial because the complained of conduct was not a comment
on Johnson's silence.
D.

Viewed Retrospectively, And In Context Of The Entire Record, The Brief
Reference To Leonard's Initial Statement That She Did Not Want To
Answer Questions Did Not Render Johnson's Trial Unfair
A district court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for

mistrial unless, viewed retrospectively, and in the context of the full trial, the
event that precipitated the motion for mistrial constituted reversible error. State
v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912, 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2003); State v.
Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, _ , 297 P.3d 257, 263 (Ct. App. 2013); see also
I.C.R. 29.1 (a) (mistrial appropriate only when there occurs an error

that "is

prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial."). "An error
is harmless, not necessitating reversal, if the reviewing court is able to declare

4

In making this argument, the state in no way intends to imply that evidence
regarding Leonard's statement that she did not want to answer questions was
admissible against Johnson. See Homes, 654 N.E.2d at 668 (citing United
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975)) ("Generally, an accused's silence
during police interrogation cannot be used for impeachment purposes because it
is so ambiguous that it lacks the requisite inconsistency with his later exculpatory
testimony at trial."). The state merely asserts that the reference to Leonard's
post-Miranda invocation of her right to remain silent did not violate Johnson's
own constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Because the claimed
constitutional violation was the only basis on which Johnson moved for a mistrial,
he has failed to show error in the denial of his motion.
12

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict."
Frauenberger, 154 Idaho at_, 297 P.3d at 263 (citing Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979
(2010) ). For the reasons set forth above, Johnson cannot vicariously rely on any
alleged violation of Leonard's constitution privilege against self-incrimination to
establish a violation of his own constitutional rights. Even if he could, he would
still not be entitled to reversal because, viewed retrospectively and in the context
of the full record, there is no reasonable possibility that the brief reference to
Leonard's invocation of the right to remain silent contributed to the jury's verdict
or otherwise deprived Johnson of a fair trial.
The only prejudice Johnson has ever claimed to have suffered as a result
of the introduction of evidence that Leonard initially stated she did not want to
answer questions was the risk that "somehow" the jury would impute Leonard's
silence to Johnson and infer his guilt therefrom. (Tr., p.531, L.22 - p.533, L.3,
p.542, L.6 - p.543, L.6; Appellant's brief, pp.13-17.)

Contrary to Johnson's

assertions, however, the risk that the jury would do so was, at worst, negligible
and, at best, nonexistent.
As already discussed above, the constitutional protections afforded by the
Fifth Amendment insulate defendants from the adverse effects of their own
invocation of silence in the face of custodial interrogation. As a matter of law,
those protections do not extend to defendants claiming a violation of someone
else's right to silence. See Section C, supra (and cases cited therein). Implicit in
this distinction is a recognition that a defendant cannot be prejudiced in any

13

constitutional sense by a reference at trial to a third party's invocation of the right
to remain silent. In fact, at least one Supreme Court Justice has opined that the
use at trial of "a witness' prior silence does not raise any inference prejudicial to
the defendant, and, indeed, does not even raise any inference that the
defendant remained silent."

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 627 n.5 (1976)

(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Aside from not being prejudicial to Johnson as a matter of law, there are
also several reasons the reference to Leonard's initial invocation of her right to
remain silent was also not reversible error under the facts of this case. First, the
reference was fleeting and made very near the beginning of Leonard's recorded
police interview, at a point where Leonard had already made statements to the
officer that indicated she used illegal drugs. (See Tr., p.514, L.15 - p.515, L.22;
State's Exhibit 37.) The reference was also somewhat ambiguous, consisting
solely of the officer's statements to Leonard:

"You talked to Officer Reimers.

Okay. I would rather not charge you with a bunch of stuff that isn't really - that's
yours. And I know you said to him that you didn't want to answer questions."
(Tr., p.515, Ls.17-22.) In addition, the recording was presented after Leonard
had taken the stand and testified. (See generally, Tr., pp.448-78.) While the
comments in the recording may have communicated to the attorneys, trained in
the law, that Leonard initially invoked her Miranda rights, it is far from clear on
this record that the jury would have attributed the same meaning to the
comments, much less that it would have inferred either defendant's guilt from
Leonard's initial desire to not answer any questions. Indeed, given "the way [the
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reference to Leonard's initial assertion of silence] came up in this case," even the
district court was "not convinced that the jury" would "pay any attention to it."
(Tr., p.548, Ls.20-22.)
Second, it is clear from the record that the prosecutor neither intended to
use nor actually used the reference to Leonard's initial invocation of silence as
substantive evidence of either Leonard's or Johnson's guilt.

By the time the

reference was made, the jury had already heard testimony that Johnson and
Leonard had both made admissions tending to establish their guilt of the charged
crimes. (See Tr., p.309, L.3 - p.321, L.12, p.355, L.9 - p.357, L.7, p.395, Ls.722.) The prosecutor introduced the recording in which the reference was made
for the purpose of impeaching Leonard's self-exculpatory trial testimony with
statements Leonard actually made after waiving her Miranda rights. While the
inclusion in the original recording of the fact that Leonard initially indicated a
desire to not answer any questions was improper, the prosecutor did not seek to
exploit that reference, nor was he permitted to do so.

The district court

specifically admonished the parties to refrain from commenting on the reference
to Leonard's initial invocation (Tr., p.534, L.23 - p.535, L.7) - which the court
found was included in the original recording due to an oversight by the
prosecutor (Tr., p.529, Ls8-11) - and also took steps to ensure the original
recording was not submitted to the jury during its deliberations (Tr., p.551, L.24 p.552, L.18; R., p.150). In the end, a redacted recording containing only those
statements that were actually inconsistent with Leonard's trial testimony was
admitted for the jury's consideration. (See Tr., p.639, L.3 - p.651, L.1 O; State's
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Exhibit 37B.) In light of this fact, and in light of the fact that the jury was never
exposed to any evidence that Johnson exercised his right to silence in the face
of custodial interrogation, there can be little doubt that the jury did not impute
Leonard's silence to Johnson for the purpose of inferring his guilt.
Third, even assuming, as suggested by Johnson's counsel below (see Tr.,
p.532, Ls.4-9, p.543, Ls.1-6), that the jury could potentially have drawn some
negative inference from Leonard's initial post-Miranda silence and imputed that
inference to Johnson because he exercised his right not to testify, any potential
prejudice was ameliorated by the court's jury instructions. The court specifically
instructed the jury that "[a] defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right
not to be compelled to testify" and that it "must not draw any inference of guilt
from the fact that the defendant does not testify." (R., p.115.) Presuming, as
this Court must, that the jury followed this instruction, see State v. Grantham,
146 Idaho 490, 198 P.3d 128 (Ct. App. 2008), there is no reasonable possibility
that the reference to Leonard's post-Miranda silence contributed to Johnson's
verdict.
Finally, although Johnson claims otherwise, the evidence of his guilt was
overwhelming. During the execution of a search warrant at Johnson's residence,
officers found a safe containing methamphetamine, marijuana, measuring
devices, packaging materials, pipes and over $300 in cash. (Tr., p.164, Ls.5-7,
p.183, L.19 - p.190, L.3, p.192, L.13 - p.195, L.9, p.196, L.8 - p.199, L.10;
State's Exhibits 6-8, 10-17.) The safe also contained a number of Johnson's
personal effects, including his social security card, birth certificate, vehicle title
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and credit card. (Tr., p.190, L.4 - p.191, L.10, p.390, L.19- p.392, L.19; State's
Exhibits 9, 34-36.) In a post-Miranda interview, Johnson admitted the safe was
his. (Tr., p.395, Ls.7-22.) While there was no fingerprint evidence specifically
connecting Johnson to the contraband inside the safe, there "was nobody else's
[identifying information] in there but his." (Tr., p.360, Ls.2-20.) Moreover, there
was no credible evidence that anyone but Johnson had access to the safe or the
contraband in it. 5 Given the strength of the evidence against Johnson, there is
no reasonable possibility that the brief reference to his co-defendant's initial
statement that she did not want to answer questions contributed to the jury's
verdict.
Review of the record shows the reference to Leonard's initial statement
expressing a desire to not answer questions was both fleeting and ambiguous.
The trial court took steps, short of declaring a mistrial, to ensure that neither
defendant was prejudiced, including by instructing the jury to draw no adverse
inference from the fact that Johnson did not testify.

There was no further

evidence of this matter presented. Under these circumstances, and given the
strength of the evidence supporting his convictions, Johnson has failed to show
error in the denial of his motion for a mistrial.

Although Leonard testified in her case-in-chief that Jacob Lee had access to
the safe and placed the bag containing the contraband in the safe on the same
day officers searched it (see Tr., p.457, L.16 - p.458, L.1, p.461, L.17 - p.462,
L.5), the bulk of her testimony was thoroughly discredited both on crossexamination (see Tr., p.478, Ls.12-18) and in the state's rebuttal case through
the admission of the audio recording of her police interview (see Tr., p.639, L.3 p.651, L.1 O; State's Exhibit 37B).
5
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11.
Johnson Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion

A.

Introduction
Johnson argues the unified sentence of 15 years, with three years fixed,

imposed upon his conviction for possessing methamphetamine with the intent to
deliver, is excessive and unnecessary to achieve the goals of sentencing.
(Appellant's brief, pp.18-22.)

The record, however, supports the sentence

imposed; Johnson has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the
sentencing court abused its discretion. Id.

C.

Johnson Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any
Reasonable View Of The Facts
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577,
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

kl
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The district court considered the objectives of sentencing and concluded,
based on Johnson's character and the nature of the crime, that society needed
to be protected and Johnson needed to be punished.

(Sent. Tr., p.15, L.6 -

p.18, L.20.) Significant to the sentencing court were Johnson's criminal record
(Sent. Tr., p.16, Ls.4-20, p.18, Ls.21-23), his failure to overcome his own
addiction or be deterred despite prior legal sanctions and opportunities to
rehabilitate (Sent. Tr., p.16, L.4 - p.17, L.10, p.19, Ls.10-12), and the fact that
Johnson was "creating havoc" and "real harm to others" by distributing "the
number one

or

number two

most addictive

substance

out there"

-

methamphetamine (Sent. Tr., p.17, L.11 - p.18, L.20). The record supports the
court's reasoning.
Johnson has a long history of substance abuse and drug-related crimes.
He pied guilty to his first felony (possession of methamphetamine with intent to
deliver) in 1991 and received a withheld judgment. (PSI, pp.34-35.) In 1993, he
was "placed on [a] specialized substance abuse caseload due to his continued
drug usage and failure to comply with his probation requirements." (PSI, p.101.)
After being placed in the substance abuse caseload, Johnson continued to
exhibit "extremely poor" progress on probation. (PSI, pp.101-02.) In 1994, his
withheld judgment was revoked and he was sentenced to a period of retained
jurisdiction, after which he was again placed on probation. (PSI, pp.81, 83-84.)
He very quickly violated that probation by, among other things, using marijuana
and methamphetamine on a regular basis. (PSI, pp.80-81, 89-92.) He was also
convicted of his second felony (possession of methamphetamine) in 1996. (PSI,
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pp.3, 81, 84.) He served concurrent prison terms in both cases, was granted
and then violated one term of parole, was granted a second parole and was
finally discharged from parole in 2002. (PSI, p.3.) In 2011, Johnson was again
using and distributing methamphetamine. (PSI, pp.4-5; R., p.124.)
Johnson cites his "frequent headaches," drug addiction, and family
support as factors he claims the district court did not find adequately mitigating.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 13-15.) Even considering these factors, however, Johnson
has shown no abuse of discretion.
This case represents Johnson's third conviction for a felony drug offense,
and his second conviction for possessing methamphetamine with the intent to
deliver.

He has previously violated probation or parole on at least three

occasions and, as found by the district court, has "squandered" multiple prior
opportunities to overcome his addiction and "move on with [his] life." (Sent. Tr.,
p.19, Ls.10-12.)

The crime at issue carries a maximum sentence of

life

imprisonment. See I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A). The relatively short three-year fixed
sentence imposed by the district court will give Johnson a meaningful opportunity
for parole, while the lengthier 12-year indeterminate sentence will allow ample
opportunity for rehabilitation if he secures release though sufficiently good
behavior.

Johnson has failed to show the sentence is excessive under any

reasonable view of the facts and has therefore failed to show an abuse of
discretion.
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CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and
sentence.
DATED this 10th day of September 2013.
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